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THE CASE AGAINST THE MFECANE
by. QuJJjun Cobbing.
By the 1970s the mfecane had become one of the most widely abused
terms in southern African historical literature. Let the reader
attempt a simple definition of the mfecane, for instance. This is not
such an easy task. From one angle the mfecane was the Nguni diaspora
which from the early 1820s took Nguni raiding communities such as the
Ndebele, the Ngoni and the Gaza over a huge region of south-central
Africa reaching as far north as Lake Tanzania. Africanists stress the
positive features of the movement. As Ajayi observed in 1968: 'When we
consider all the implications of the expansions of Bantu-speaking
peoples there can he no doubt that the theory of stagnation has no
basis whatsoever.' A closely related, though different, mfecane
centres on Zululand and the figure of Shaka. It has become a
revolutionary process internal to Nguni society which leads to the
development of the ibutho and the tributary mode of production. Shaka
is a heroic figure providing a positive historical example and some
self-respect for black South Africans today.
But inside these wider definitions another mfecane more specific-
ally referring to the impact of Nguni raiders (the Nedbele, Hlubi and
Ngwane) on the Sotho west of the Drakensberg. This mfecane encompasses
a great field of African self-destruction extending from the Limpopo
to the Orange. It allegedly depopulated vast areas of what became the
Orange Free State, the Transvaal and, with the aid of the Zulu, Natal,
which thus lay empty for white expansion. Dispersed African survivors
clustered together and in time formed the enclave states of Lesotho,
Swaziland and Botswana. What Omer-Cooper terms the 'general distribu-
tion of white and Bantu landownership' in South Africa was thereby
established. On these African-created foundations rose the so-called
Bantustans or Homelands of twentieth-century South Africa.
These conceptual contradictions coexist within mfecane theory with
contrasting definitions of timing. As an era of history the latter
1trans-orangian' mfecane invariably begins in about 1820 and ends in
either 1828 with the departure of the Ngwane, or in the mid-l830s with
the arrival of the French missionaries and the Boers. The Zulu-cen-
tred mfecane, on the other hand, begins with the career of Dingiswayo
at the end of the eighteenth century and often continues until the end
of the Zulu kingdom in 1879. Subcontinental mfecanes sometimes
continue until the 1890s. In short, there is no one definition of the
mfecane. It can refer to people, to an era, to a process of internal
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development. It can be constructive, destructive; pro African, anti
African; geographically narrow, or subcontinental.
Not all of these contradictions can be resolved. Their existence
requires an explanation, since their origins are by now well buried in
the historiography. In the first part of this article my intention is
to unravel the development of mfecane as it has been handed down in
South African historiography. Many writers have had a hand in
creating the mfecane. The poor taste of the dish derives from the poor
quality of the initial ingredients. In the second part, I suggest
some lines of attack on the pillars of mfecane mythology, and leave it
to the reader to decide whether the concept is worth salvaging.
THE MFECANE/LIFAQANE IN THE HISTORICAL LITERATURE
Mfecane and lifaqane (or difaqane) are synonyms. The former
derives from E.A. Walker's 1928 standardisation of a word which had
previously existed in many forms; lifaqane from MacGregor's 1904
standardisation of a Sotho variant current around Morija in the
nineteenth century. The word mfecane is of Xhosa origin and emerged
into the written traditions in the 1820s along the 'eastern frontier',
that is the region between the Fish and the Umzimvubu rivers, today's
Ciskei and southern Transkei. Walker's translation, 'the crushing1,
despite widespread subsequent repetition, is almost certainly an
error. Nineteenth-century forms such as fetcani, infanicama, imfet-
canie, Il-Fitcanie, fickanees, and others, indicate that it derives
from the Xhosa ukufaca meaning 'to be weak; emaciated from hunger'.
The primary association with famine must be stressed. Variations all
contain the Xhosa ' c' click, which southern Sotho does not possess.
The linguistic inference is that the southern Sotho version, lifaqane,
derives from the Xhosa original rather than vice-versa. The interming-
ling of Xhosa and Sotho in the southern Drakensberg and the
inter-group raiding between the Caledon and the Kei suggest that the
variants may have existed in close proximity. No variant exists in
the northern Nguni dialects, for example in Zulu. This explains why
none of the historians of the Zulu such as Stuart and Bryant ever used
mfecane; an irony in view of Shaka's later elevation into the heart of
the mfecane.
The fetcani (emaciated intruders) enter the written records in
southern Nguni country in the mid-1820s. At that time the Thernbu and
Xhosa on both sides of the Kei were under considerable pressure from
the British and the Boers to the south-west, from Zulu-driven refugees
(amafengu) in the north-east, and from Sotho raiders descending from
the Caledon valley to the north-west. These latter raiders the Thembu
called f&tcani. The first raiders recorded by the whites were those
of 1823, although there is nothing to suggest they had not come
across on earlier occasions. Further Sotho fetcani attacks on the
Thembu took place in, 1825 and 1827. One of the leaders was a Sotho
chief named Maketa. Fetcani was used to refer either merely to an
enemy commando composed of men, or more embracingly to migrant groups
including women, children and cattle. It depended on the context. In
1827 the Sotho raiders were joined by Matiwane's Ngwane who descended
into the region between the Mbashee and the Umvimvubu and began to
terrorise the Thembu. British soldiers, who had been called in to
1
 protect' the Thembu and prevent them from encroaching south,
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routinely confused Sotho, Ngwane and Zulu, referring to all of them as
fetcani. But in time the term came to be reserved for the Ngwane
alone. The British attack on and dispersal of the Ngwane at Mbolompo
in August 1828 became legendary in nineteenth-century Cape history and
the term stuck. In traditions of the 1880s fetcani and Ngwane had
become synonyms. Matiwane ,and his fetcani 'hordes' had become
execrated half-devil figures. As late as 1930 Soga was still using
the term in this purist sense when he referred to ' Ngwana, the
progenitor of the Ama-Ngwana tribe, the terribe Mfecane or "freeboot-
ers", who destroyed the Hlubi tribe.1 Macmillan on the other hand
correctly saw no reason to confine fetcani to the Ngwane. His
assumption in 1938 that feetani (wandering, destitute people) and
amafengu (refugees) were synonyms was a logical though linguistically
inaccurate inference in the context of Xhosa country where both words
co-existed.
By the 1930s the purist use of fetcani had long been superceded.
The first use of the Sotho version lifaqane that I can find is by the
French missionary Arbousset in the early 1840s. He used lifaqane as a
nickname for the Zulu or Bakoni, 'that is to sayfc those who hew down
... with the chake, their formidable battle-axe'. Here, 'Zulus' can
refer to the Zulu, Ndebele, Hlubi or Ngwane. Early in the twentieth
century Ellenberger (one of Arbousset's successors at Morija) and
MacGregor significantly embroidered the term. The lifaqane was now
not just a reference to people, but to a whole era of southern Sotho
history. It centred no longer on the struggle between the Sotho, the
Ngwane and the Thembu on the Kei, but on a wider conflict involving
the Sotho on the one hand and the Ngwane, now joined by the Ndebele
and Hlubi on the other. Other characters in what was now a Caledon
valley play were the Tlokwa of Ntatisi and her son, Sekonyela. The
era began abruptly in about 1820 with the Nguni invasions from the
east, and ended equally abruptly with the departure of Matiwane's
Ngwane to the south-east in either 1827 or 1828. It was definable,
according to MacGregor, by the bloody and unusual nature of the
warfare. Before 1820, so went the allegation, warfare had been the
'ordinary kind of war between settled tribes where only the fighting
men go out'. Afterwards it 'was waged by nomadic tribes accompanied
on the warpath by their women, children and property. ' Part of the
plot involved the by now well known 'railway shunting' sequence in
which the Hlubi and Ngwane attacked the Tlokwa, the Tlokwa attacked
the Fokeng and Hlakoana, and the latter in turn attacked the Tlhaping.
The Tlokwa and Sekonyela join Matiwane and his Ngwane as the
villains. But there is now a hero: Moshoeshoe. Ellenberger and
MacGregor's lifaqane is- in essence little more than an epic story
centred on Moshoeshoe and his post 1824 citadel of Thaba Bosiu. On
the one hand there was Matiwane, 'an absolute fiend in human shape';
on the other: 'In the centre of this seething mass of hate and horror
sat Moshesh, like a benevolent eagle on an impregnable eyrie,1 The
other heroes in this sustained eulogy of the Sotho chief are by
implication the French missionaries themselves, Moshoeshoe's sage
advisers, whose arrival in 1832 ended the holocaust.
Before their arrival, for example, other characters vital to the
production, the cannibals, are said to have terrorised vast districts,
eating what the Ngwane and Tlokwa had overlooked. 'These creatures,'
wrote Scully, 'were nocturnal in their habits ... Their taste for
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21human flesh grew until they would eat no other meat.1 Ellenberger's
methods may be illustrated by reference to his calculation of the
number of cannibal victims:
In our turn, seventy years later, let us endeavour to
consider the ravages of these maneaters. Let us estimate
the number of cannibals at a minimum, say 4,000. Say each
one ate one person a month, and we arrive at a total of
48,000 persons eaten during one year; and during the six
worst years, between 1822 and 1828, at the appalling
figure of 288,000 people devoured by their fellows. If we
allow for those eaten during subsequent years, it is easy
to arrive at a total of 300,000.
Fortunately, the arrival of Arbousset and Casalis in 1832 brought
the curtain down on the Caledon valley lifaqane. The cannibals soon
stopped being cannibals; for the local Africans began a new era of
light and progress.
By the turn of the present century a geographical extension of the
mfecane had taken place which linked the Caledon valley to the western
regions of transorangia, to the Transvaal in the north, as well as to
the region between the Tugela and the Pongola rivers in the east.
This extension is particularly to be associated with Theal. Although
Theal, as far as I am aware, never used the word mfecane, the idea of
the mfecane is rooted in his work. In the rather brief sections
devoted to African history, Theal goes out of his way to highlight the
intertribal slaughter. His intention surfaced (the passage was
excised in later editions) in his 1891 History of South Africa. His
central claim was that African self destruction made insignificant
'the total loss of human life occasioned by all the wars in South
Africa in which Europeans have engaged since first they set foot in
the country'. Theal's calculation skills exceeded even those of
Ellenberger. The losses of the Tlokwa alone he guessed at 113-000,
1
 only a small proportion of the loss being from dispersion' . He
repeated the claim that these same Tlokwa were personally responsible
for the destruction of twenty-eight 'distinct tribes' (including,
incidentally, the Ngwato and the Rolong), a figure which is
occasionally rounded up to thirty, or even to 'hundreds'. In the pan
Caledon region, Theal claimed, 300,000 people had died. East of the
Drakensberg, in addition, 'at least half a million had perished'.
In 1903 Theal gratuitously doubled the number of deaths 'in the whole
of the ravaged country' which now stood at 'nearer two millions than
one'. It was a figure which may not have been all that far short of
the total African population of the region.
In the era of the union of South Africa, when British soldiers -
after crushing African resistance - forcibly united white South
Africa, there was a thriving historical industry using Theal and
Ellenberger to prove that by 1830 the Orange Free State, the Transvaal
and Natal had been entirely or virtually depopulated and that European
claims to the land were therefore legitimate. This was the era of
the Lagden Commission, the 1913 Natives Land Act and the elaboration
of the machinery of land segregation in South Africa. The
historians provided the justification for the politicians. In his
1922 Historical Atlas of South Africa, in a map entitled 'The Bantu
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Devastation and the Great Trek, 1820-48', Theal's disciple, Walker,
shaded in an enormous depopulated zone which covered, in addition to
Theal's deserted areas, the whole of the northern Transkei and large
areas of eastern Botswana. Variations of this map have been produced
on several occasions, even in respectable works of African history.
In his 1928 A History of South Africa Walker now coined the term
mfecane for the process. In the second edition of the work
published in 1940 Walker went further and inserted the word mfecane
into the paragraph dealing with Shaka and the 'storm-centre' between
the Tugela and the Mkusi. This was the first time that Shaka and the
word mfecane had been juxtaposed. It may not be overfanciful to see
this step in the context of the European events of 1939 and a comment
of Walker's in which the Nguni and the Nazis are cryptically combined:
The course of events in South Africa throws a revealing
light on the working of world-wide forces. Western peoples
everywhere are defending their standards of life against
spare-living alien folk. They can, if they will, see that
struggle in all its nakedness in South Africa.
Nevertheless Walker's use of mfecane was unsystematic. The gross-
mfecane of the 1960s was still only foreshadowed. Between the 1920s
and the early 1960s the linguistic variations of fetcani led separate
lives. Some writers, such as Agar-Hamilton, extended Ellenberger's
lifaqane into Theal's context of tha^truggle between the Ndebele and
the Boers north of the Vaal river. Others, such as Tabler, used
Walker's mfecane, as did Geen; but they were fairly exceptional.
Others still used Ellenberger's lifaqane in its narrowly Caledon
valley context. There was no agreement. MacMillan had minor reser-
vations about depopulation. The more observant De Kiewiet spoke of
transorangia as 'already an area of settlement, of settlement by a
great Bantu population. Much of the energy of the Boers was used more
against the natives than against Nature.'
Afrikaner writers either ignored Africans altogether, or as yet
lacked the sophistication to conceal the conflict between the Boers
and Africans who indisputably existed in the paths of their advance.
In its earlier stages the mfecane was very much an Englishman's le-
gend. Nor did the historians of the Zulu talk of the mfecane. Mfecane
is after all a Xhosa word. Writers on the Zulu tended to isolate Zulu
history as an epic separate from the rest of southern Africa. Fynn,
Isaacs and Bird did not use the mfecane; neither did Stuart or Bryant;
nor did Ritter and the early Becker. Even the appearance of the
third edition of Walker's book, now entitled A Hitory of Southern
Africa, in 1957 did little to alter the situation. As late as 1960
there was no inevitability that the mfecane would survive.
In the mid-1960s, however, the mfecane underwent its last and most
dramatic geographical expansion: from the pan South African region to
one which embraced huge areas north of the Limpopo and Zambesi. This
turning point in the mfecane's fortunes should be seen against the
background of the creation of the new independent African states, the
proliferation of African universities and of Africanist studies in
Africa, in Europe and the United States, and of the quest for an
acceptable African self-image in which the historians were again to
play a major part. The book which provided the focus for the
The Ca^e Against the. Mfecane.
extension was J. D. Omer-Cooper's Zulu-Aftermath, a book significantly
subtitled A Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Bantu Africa. Zulu
Aftermath is partly a collage of the older views of the mfecane. But
as the title suggests, the mfecane (which Omer-Cooper in effect uses
as a synonym for the title) is now far more than an era of destruction
in African history. It is now a process of profound change within
African society. 'The purpose of the present work,' wrote Omer-
Cooper,
is to give an analysis of the movement as a whole; to
relate the great chain of wars and migrations to the
underlying processes of socio-political change and to
attempt an assessment of the significance of the Mfecane
in the history of Southern and Central Africa, the way it
affected later developments and its enduring importance
for an understanding of the contemporary situation.
Thus the evolution of the ibutho amongst the Ngune, the wars be-
tween the Zulu and the Ndwandwe, and the rise of the Zulu kingdom are,
half a century after Bryant, made integral to the mfecane. Shaka
becomes a hero; Mzilikazi a creative state-builder. 'The movement as a
whole' is expanded to bring in Swaziland and the career of Mswati,
Gazaland and the careers of Soshangane and Mzila, as well as the Ngoni
states of Mbelwa and Mpezeni. The validity both of these conceptual
and geographical expansions and of their linkage to the original
concepts of the mfecane has so far remained unremarked.
As to the linkage of the mfecane to 'an understanding of the con-
temporary situation,' Omer-Cooper's analysis is (unsurprisingly)
subjective. It is also highly contradictory. In the one direction,
'the traditions of the Mfecane have retained their fascination because
they provide a bulwark of self-respect, a shield against the crippling
sense of inferiority, encouraged by the authority structure of white-
dominated society.' Whereas in the other, 'the battles and massacres
of the Mfecane ... account for the general distribution of white and
Bantu landownership [in South Africa today].' The latter is a claim
few Africans would accept.
Omer-Cooper's two claims for the mfecane have in turn underpinned
two incompatible mfecane traditions in the 1970s. The more liberal of
these traditions is located mainly in Europe, the United States and in
the South African English-speaking universities. It would be tedious
to list the historians of Africa who have adopted Omer-Cooper's idea
of the mfecane as a positive revolutionary idea. Before 1966 and the
publication of Zulu Aftermath general text books on African history
had not yet picked up the mfecane. By 1970 it was being integrated
in virtually all of them. July's oversimplifications is typical. 'The
driving force,' he wrote, 'was land hunger caused by population
pressure among migrating cattle keepers and the ..vehicle was the
military outburst known as the Zulu (sic) Mfecane.' In 1969 Leonard
Thompson discussed the difaqane in the influential Oxford History of
South Africa. W.F. Lye has built an academic career on the mfecane:
he wavers between Ellenberger's older version in which Matiwane and
Mzilikazi are denigrated and the newer one in which they are talented
state-builders. R. Kent Rasmussen in an analysis of the early
Ndebele state describes the Ndebele in an unambiguously positive
manner. During the early 1970s a generation of students within and
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without southern Africa (including myself) wrote theses in which,
while we questioned much, the status of the mfecane was taken for
granted. Scholars annotating the James Stuart papers (a unique
collection of traditions on the early Zulu) use the mfecane as a
central idea in the footnotes, whereas it is conspicuously absent in
Stuart's tex±s- This footnote-text dichotomy is found in several
other works. In South Africa the mfecane has become a shorthand term
to describe virtually the entire history of South Africa's black
population in the nineteenth century. In at least one South African
university the mfecane has become the title of a separate third-year
paper, paralleling another dealing essentially with white history.
But Omer-Cooper founded a second tradition. This is now well rooted
in South Africa's schools and in the Afrikaner universities. This
tradition springs from Omer-Cooper's linkage of the mfecane with the
creation of the 'Homeland' system which the Nationalist government was
refining in South Africa during the 1960s. Once again, historians were
at hand knowingly or unknowingly prepared to legitimate the eviction
of Africans into the 'Homelands' by tinkering with the past. F.A. van
Jaarsveld fpr instance welcomed Omer-Cooper's analysis with unconceal-
ed delight. On its base he came to three linked conclusions:
1. 'The white states which arose out of the trek were each centred
on areas particularly heavily devastated by the Mfecane*'
2. 'By 1836 the Bantu population of South Africa was arranged in
the shape of a horseshoe ... with a vacuum of empty space in
between.'
3. 'The present-day Bantu homelands were already present in embryo
arranged in this horseshoe.'
These premises van Jaarsveld uses to demonstrate to his readers the
smooth continuity in South African history:
From the time of earliest contact a policy of territorial
separation had been followed. This policy was directly
responsible for the creation of the Bantu's own homelands
which were reserved for them by law during the 19th and
20th centuries.
The twentieth century has thus merely legalised a nineteenth-century
position created by the Africans themselves.
It is unlikely that this variant of mfecane propaganda has many
adherents outside South Africa. In South Africa it is not only central
to some University courses, but is being pumped daily into school
children of all race groups. South African school children are fed on
a mixed diet of Theal, Ellenberger, Walker and Omer-Cooper brought up
to date by usually Afrikaner writers who heavily underline the
destructive nature of Walker's 'spare-living alien folk'. The old
favourites are all there. Kratz and Trengove in their school text-
book describe how when the Voortrekkers crossed the Orange in the
1830s 'J;he Zulus (sic) had swept the country clean of human inhab-
itants. According to Boyce, 'hundreds of smalj tribes had been
massacred ... while skeletons littered the veld.1 A neat twist by
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Van Schoor et al was to convert the Voortrekkes into kindly policemen
who 'helped to bring an end to the murder and slaughter of the
Difaqane, and offering some remnants of the Bantu peoples the oppor-
tunity of restoration and development.' Smit, Kreuser and Vlok
follow van Jaarsveld and in a section entitled ' The Results of the
Mfekane' inform their standard eight readers how these remnants were
'spread across South Africa in a horse shoe formation ... This redis-
tribution formed the basis for the present-day bantu homelands.' By
the beginning of the 1980s the mfecane meant very different things to
African university students north of the Zambesi and to schoolchildren
south of the Limpopo.
Today, then, the mfecane has come a long way from the fetcani
raiders of the 1820s. The mfecane is mainly an historiographical
development of the twentieth century which has been closely interwoven
with the growth of white history. Somewhat chimerically it has since
the 1960s been adapted and extended by writers sympathetic to the
African past. The two approaches often exist side by side, unnoticed,
in the same text. Geographically the mfecane has undergone a four
stage expansion. It began in the 1820s as a narrowly eastern frontier
concept as a reference to Sotho and Ngwane raiders on the Thembu. It
was extended into the Caledon valley by Ellenberger and MacGregor,
where it brought in the Tlokwa, the Hlubi and Ndebele, and centred on
the heroic careers of Moshoeshoe and the French missionaries- It was
taken into the Transvaal, Natal and Zululand by Theal and Walker.
Finally it was exported north of the Limpopo and Zambesi by
Omer-Cooper. Semantically mfecane has undergone a parallel expansion-
In the first place fetcani referred to people. By the early twentieth
century lifaqane had become an era of southern Sotho history. By the
1960s the mfecane began to refer in addition to a revolutionary
process of socio-political change within Nguni society. Today the
multi-concept of the mfecane has divided into two separate streams.
The one is Africanist, and stresses the dynamism and creativeness of
the southern African past. The other is at home in South Africa and
racist. It links the alleged excesses of the mfecane to the creation
and legitimisation of the South African system of territorial
apartheid.
SOME SHORTCOMINGS OF THE MFECANE
There is not necessarily anything unacceptable about a concept that
evolves a century after the events to which it alludes. Nor is it
necessarily the case that an expansion in meaning of an earlier
concept invalidates it. But the mfecane is too deeply flawed for it to
continue as an acceptable axiom. For one thing, the factual
foundations on which it is built - especially those of Theal and
Ellenberger - are those of shifting sands. Rasmussen's remark about
the Ndebele almost certainly applies more strongly still to the Ngwa-
ne, the Hlubi and Tlokwa. 'One could adduce,' he wrote, 'examples of
false associations between almost every possible combination of
unrelated events between 1828 and 1832. Untold violence has been done
to the correct sequence of events, making intelligent interpretations
nearly impossible. ' Accurate data, however, was never absolutely
essential in a concept which rapidly became a device of propaganda.
The idea of the mfecane was evolved at the beginning of this century
to help historians to evade an analysis of the confrontations between
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the races in nineteenth-century South Africa. While black self-des-
truction was heavily over-exposed, often on the flimsiest of evidence,
the impact of British and Boer expansion on African societies was
systematically downplayed, usually by ignoring it altogether. The
mfecane was a parallel form of historical apartheid.
In the brief space available I wish only to suggest strategies of
counter-attack for those who might wish to pursue the matter further.
The questions I have concentrated on (there are several others) are
these. Can one accept Ellenberger and MacGregor's version of the
Caledon valley lifaqane? Were the 'enclave states' Basutoland (now
Lesotho), Bechuanaland (now Botswana) and Swaziland created by the
mfecane? Did the mfecane depopulate the vast areas it is alleged to
have done? And what is the validity of fusing Ellenberger's lifaqane
with the 'revolution' amongst the northern Nguni at the beginning of
the nineteenth century?
How valid is Ellenberger and MacGregor's contention that the lifa-
qane was an era of unparalleled darkness in southern Sotho history
that began with the Hlubi incursions of 1820-2 and ended with the
departure of the Ngwane in 1827-8? It is worth noting that the Hlubi
occupation lasted for only three or four years and that the Ngwane
remained in the region for another two or three, this is a rather
short time for the middle era of anybody' s history. The Hlubi and
Ngwane, moveover, moved into a region on the upper Caledon which had
for several centuries seen a Sotho-Nguni interaction. The com-
bination of famine and of Nguni encroachments may have been uncomfort-
able, but it was very likely not unprecedented. What was unprecedent-
ed were the attacks of the ' Griqua' who were beginning to attack
into the Caledon at the turn of the 1820s. The Griqua were the
advance guard of the advancing whites of the Cape. It is very diffi-
cult to disentangle the efficacy of the Griqua and the Ngwane as
destabilising influences in the Caledon during the 1820s. It is cert-
ain though that in the longer term the Cape driven Griqua posed the
greater threat. Matiwane's Ngwane were gone from the Caledon by late
1827. But the problems for the southern Sotho if anything increased
between 1828 and the mid-1830s. Recent writers have recognised this
without drawing the necessary conclusion. The problem is skirted
around by extending the chronology of the lifaqane until 1835-6. As
Sanders noted: 'For Moshoeshoe and his followers the eclipse of the
Kora [in 1836] may be said to mark the close of the lifaqane.' Yet the
inference is inescapable. If the Cape originating Griqua, or Khoi
peoples driven north by Cape advancement, constitute the latter part
of the lifaqane, the idea of a purely African caused lifaqane becomes
untenable.
The omission of the Griqua from, or their fusion into the lifaqane
is frequently accompanied by a hyperbolic description of the impact of
the Ngwane in the mid-1820s. In view of the crimes pinned on the
Ngwane, it is remarkable how little we know about them. Not even the
dates of their arrival in and departure from the Caledon are known
with any precision. Ngwane relationships with Moshoeshoe's Mokoteli
appear to have been relatively peaceable, until the war of c. 1827 in
which ' the Ngwane were routed' . It is more difficult to pin the
devastations on the Ndebele or the Zulu. Ellenberger's account of the
Zulu invasion of the CaLedon in 1826 is not generally accepted.
Ndebele raids in c. 1827 and again in 1831 had a meagre impact.
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Moshoeshoe' s defeat of the Ndebele in 1831 was, as with his earlier
defeat of Matiwane, accounted a major success.
Can one turn the Tlokwa into the region's other main destabilisers,
as Ellenberger does? As noted, the Tlokwa leader, Sekonyela, served
like Matiwang as a villainous foil for the hero of the missionaries,
Moshoeshoe. But we know practically nothing about Sekonyelaps early
career, and the accounts of Tlokwa devastations are almost certainly
exaggerated as well. Marion How has shown how the long alleged
Tlokwa attack on Dithakong in 1823 did not take place. The
allegations of Tlokwa maraudings as far south as the Orange River seem
to me to be open to question. The Moshoeshoe biased accounts have
turned the Tlokwa skirmishes with the Mokoteli in 1822-4 into bloody
battles, illustrating MacGregor's claim of a generic difference
between warfare after 1820 and that before. But accounts of the
fighting seem to refer to quite 'normal1 inter-Sotho conflicts, as the
title of one of them, ' the battle of the pots' , implies. It thus
still has to be demonstrated that the scale of warfare underwent a
dramatic change in the 1820s. Much of the violence that there was was
inflicted by Sotho on Sotho. Significantly, the Sotho raids on the
Tembu in the early and mid-1820s; and the Mokoteli attacks on the
Thembu in 1828 and 1829 are conveniently omitted from definitions of
the lifaqane. This is_ironic since fetcani originally referred to
just such Sotho raiders.
Two other peculiarities of the 1820s need to be examined. The one
is the abnormally frequent visitations of drought and famine. The
other is that for the first time Europeans were on hand to describe,
exaggerate and misunderstand events. Early traveller and missionary
writings contain innumerable references to a long period of drought at
the turn of thg 1820s, succeeded by other unusually dry periods later
in the 1820s. Crops failed, pastures dried up, and sometimes whole
groups of people either starved or were compelled to move in search of
better grazing. The initial incursions of the Hlubi may have been
caused by this as much as by pressures from the Zulu. Fetcani and
famine were originally near synonyms; yet it was this definition which
was omitted by the later lifaqane theorists. Famine and Nguni raids
were not unprecedented. What was (besides the Griqua), was the
missionary presence to write it down, often emotively, with little
regard paid to the credentials of the informants, and with the subvert
intention to depict the pre-missionary era as one of darkness in
contrast to the new era dawning of Europrean enlightment. Ideas of
the lifaqane tell us as much about the missionaries, perhaps more,
than about the 1820s in African history.
Since it was the successive invasions of the Griqua and the Boers
that were to hem the southern Sotho into the mountains of the south-
west Drakensberg, Omer-Cooper's claim that Basutoland owed its origins
to the mfecane cannot be accepted. The Nguni intruders had departed
the Caledon by 1828. Despite certain attempts at detecting a new .form
of Sotho political organisation in the area by the late 1820s, by
1830 no significant structural changes had yet taken place in southern
Sotho society. The revolutionary concentration of population within
the single chieftaincy and the vastly wider powers of Moshoeshoe
compared to those of his ancestors accumulated as a result of Boer
land pressures in the 1830s and 1840s. It was Moshoeshoe•s acceptance
of the missionaries and his courting of British protection which was,
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for the Sotho, revolutionary, and which helped him forge out of the
growing regional disaster of white land seizures a new type of African
state. Even Moshoeshoe had no answer to the reunited Boers of the
1860s. Only fortuitous British aid in 1868 and again in 1910
nrevented the absorption of Basutoland into the Union of South Africa,
as happened to the Zulu. It can safely be said that Matiwane did
not father Lesotho.
With less plausibility still can Mzilikazi be regarded as a parent
of Bechuanaland. Few historians now follow Walker and Agar-Hamilton
in depicting^ the Ndebele migration across the Transvaal as purely
destructive. Far from destroying Sotho civilisation,- the Ndebele
established a new type of amalgamated Nguni-Sotho state. Reports of
the Ndebele between 1829 and 1§36 are of a flourishing, well-admin-
istered , grain-growing people. Sotho chieftaincies - Hurutshe,
Rolong, Ngwaketse and so on - continued to exist. Some, such as
Moritsane's Taung and dissident Hurutshe groups, counterattacked the
Ndebele frequently, not always without success. The Ndebele
displaced and absorbed; they did not exterminate. In the north the
Ndebele impact on the Pedi and the Venda was negligible. As in the
Caledon, the Sotho problems in transorangia were compounded seriously
by the penetration of first the Griqua, later the Boers from the
south. The latter brought with them the beginnings of a new economic
order in contradistinction to the Ndebele. Revolutionary new
alliances began, as some Sotho groups allied with the_advancing Griqua
and Boers, others joining the Ndebele for security. A Griqua-Sotho
alliance pushed Mzilikazi north of the Vaal in 1827-8; ^L Boer-
Griqua-Sotho alliance ejected him from the Marico in 1837-8. North
of the Limpopo the Ndebele were never able to dominate the Nwato of
Sekgoma and Khama. The later claims by Mzilikazi of overlordship over
the Kgatla and Ngwaketse in southern Bechuanaland should be interpret-
ed as diplomatic posturing. Bechuanaland did not emerge from the
mfecane, in short, but in the aftermath of the discovery of gold in
the Tai valley and diamonds along the Harts in the 1860s. The contest
between the English and the Boers for control of this vast land and
mineral wealth produced the Bechuanaland Protectorate of the 1890s.
Only the resistance of the Tswana chiefs prevented its incorporation
into Rhodesia.
The third 'enclave state1, Swaziland, fits even less comfortably
into mfecane theory, even if - unjustifiably, as I argue below - one
centres the mfecane on Shaka. The ancestors of the Swazi had
separated from the Ndwandwe in the Polgola valley well by the middle
of the eighteenth century. From a vantage point in what is today
southern Swaziland they were^only remotely involved in the Zulu-Ndwan-
dwe struggle of c 1812-26. Zulu attacks on Sobhuza's Ngwane were
ineffective. As late as 1840, twelve years after the conclusion of
Ellenberger's lifaqane, there was difficulty in detecting a Swazi
state. The major process of Swazi state formation took place in the
1840s and 1850s. It was Mswati who ruled after 1846 who gave his name
to and provided most of the structural definition of the kingdom. Like
the Ndebele, the Swazi were a fusion of Sotho and Nguni peoples in an
area in which such interaction had been taking place for at least two
centuries. As with Basutoland and Bechuanaland, Swaziland was a
product of a clash of African state-building with the new cir-
cumstances created bv Boer, English, and - in Swaziland's case -
Portuguese expansion. Swaziland disappeared in the Anglo-Boer deals
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of the 1890s, to be miraculously salvaged as a result of the unlikely
vicissitudes of the white civil war after 1899.
The contention that the enclave states derived from the mfecane is
thus untenable. Each, on the contrary, was a product of white
expansion. Equally untenable are the allied claims that the mfecane
pushed African peoples into a peripheral horse-shoe shaped ring that
enclosed a fertile empty arena which thereby lay fortuitously open
just in time to receive white migrants. At no time was transorangia
empty of people, or anywhere near it. No serious attempt has yet been
made to analyse Sotho population densities during the period 1810-28.
But the positions of the Kwena, Kgatla, Hurutshe, Taung, Rolong,
Ngwaketse can be charted in the 1830s by reference to their contacts
with the Griqua, Boers and Ndebele. Displaced peoples were often not
displaced far. Others remained in place; others still were absorbed
by the Ndebele. After the break-up of the Ndebele kingdom in 1838 a
proportion of their Sotho incorporates stayed behind in the Marico
valley. These were the sort of peoples De Kieviet had in mind when
refusing to accept the yarns of disappearing peoples. In the north
and north-east, the Pedi and Venda remained unconquered by the whites
until the latter years of the nineteenth century. In the Caledon
valley many of Theal and Ellenberger's allegations of population
losses, for example of the Tlokwa, are wild exaggerations. Theal's
repetition of Chase's estimate of twenty-eight disappearing tribes
should be chased from the literature once and for all. This is not
to say that the combined impact of famine, invasion and war may not
have retarded Sotho population growth in the first third of the
nineteenth century. But we badly need a study of the relative effects
of war and famine and of their interconnection. Southern transorangia
was never heavily populated. San still lived along the Orange;
further west there was desert. The southward moving Sotho lived in
large settlements leaving wide regions settled only by cattle herds,
for reasons about which there is as yet no firm agreement. The early
travellers and missionaries were adept at claiming depopulation in
areas they had neverQvisited and in attributing it to Zulu raids which
had never occurred. Such population there was developed the habit of
not displaying itself overgratuitously to Europeans on horseback and
armed with guns.
The orthodox view that 'Natal in 1836 was empty save for a few
clans huddled round th^ English traders at Port Natal,' is even fur-
ther from the truth. These allegations were first made by white
landseekers. Several of them claimed that Shaka and/or Dingane had
granted them a huge region south of the Tugela, occasionally reaching
as far as the UmzimvubiJL, and that the kings had generously depopulated
it for them as well. This profligacy of the the Zulu kings should
not be taken too seriously. There are, on the contrary, some
indications that the population of Natal may have increased during the
Shaka and Dingane era. In the early 1850s, one of the lucky recipients
of Shaka's land generosity, Fynn, drew up a list of nearly a hundred
Nguni groups known to have heen in Natal in 1820. Most of them were
still identifiable in 1850. Throughout the reigns of Dingiswayo and
Shaka there was a constant flow of people into Natal. The Tuli,
Kwela, Mbili and Komo groups, for example, moved into the region
around modern Pinetown, pushed south by the Qabe. In the 1820s groups
of Qabe themselves moved into Natal, to be followed by others in the
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1830s. After the killing of the Mbo chief, Zihlandhlo, in 1830-1, Mbo
groups fled into the region south of what was to become Pietermaritz-
burg, where they found other Nguni in situ. Lala groups lived in the
coastal belt between the Tugela and the Mkomanzi. Groups of Thembu
from north of the Tugela were pushed towards the Umzimkulu; another
under Jolpe moved into the Pomeroy region of what is now north-western
Natal. Putini's Mangwe lived in the Ladysmith area in the 1830s,
moving south to Estcourt in 1838-40. We know little as yet of the
relationships between the Nguni of Natal and Shaka and Dingane.
Whether they were raided by the Zulu (and/or Mpondo), paid tribute, or
lived .fairly independently is unclear. But that they were there is
clear.
More contentious, though still unstudied, are the cannibals. The
frequent references to cannibalism in missionary literature and in
oral traditions suggest - on the no smoke without fire principle -
that cannibalism did occasionally occur, at least in an area touching
on the Wilge, Caledon and upper Tugela valleys. But Ellenberger's:
' From small beginnings it spread over the whole country between the
Orange and the Vaal, depopulating the land' seems unlikely and
certainly needs testing. His methods of calculating the number of
cannibal victims, mentioned earlier, are not very advanced. Many of
the missionary accounts of cannibal bands feasting have the atmosphere
of highly embroidered reports of scenes they had not witnessed.
Practically every reference to cannibals in the James Stuart Papers is
to the rumours of the existence of cannibals, who were never seen by
his informants' informants. Several questions need to be asked more
insistently than they have hitherto.
 n#hy do reports of cannibalism
come mainly from the Caledon region? What was the association of
cannibalism with famine? Was it a phenomenon just of the 1820s, or
did it go back to the great madlatule famine of 1799-1803? How
frequent was its incidence? Why did the Sotho resort to human flesh
when the region contained abundant game? After these questions have
been explored, and only then, will it be justifiable to link cannibal-
ism specifically to the invasion of Matiwane and Mpangazitha and to
Ellenberger•s lifaqane. At present these connections are based more
on supposition and faith than on fact.
The allegations of genocide attributed to the Ngune and Tlokwa
belong in the realms of white mfecane propaganda. This propaganda has
had the mainly intentional effect of drawing attention away from the
far greater violence unleashed by the whites themselves in nine-
teenth-century southern Africa. The mfecane is a distorting lens
through which South African history has been fragmented into separated
compartments, with a selective focus on black-black interactions. The
shattering impact of European militarism on black societies has been
blurred or (as in Theal) denied altogether. At any rate it awaits its
historian. The mfecane is a curtain drawn over some of the key
interactions of South African history.
After the arrival of the British at the Cape in 1806 the whites
were armed with guns and artillery, possessed sophisticated communica-
tion and commissariat systems, had the use of horses and wagons, and
clad their soldiers with the excellent and cheap products of the new
Lancashire cotton mills. The British armies were backed by a unique
industrial revolution which, except in cases of carelessness or
parsimony, ensured their easy victory over even the strongest African
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societies. The era of Shaka and Dingane, the second to the fifth
decades of the nineteenth century, was exactly the era of the
unprecedentedly (for Africans) vicious Anglo-Boer attacks into Xhosa
territory along the 'eastern frontier'. On the one had there were the
relatively ineffectual forays of the Zulu into the northern Transkei.
On the other, in the south, began a forty-year assault beginning with
the driving of the Xhosa across the Fish River in 1811-12, the seizure
in 1819 of Xhosa lands as far as the Keiskamma, and the desperate (for
the Xhosa) wars of 1834, 1846 and 1850. It ended for the Xhosa in
the catastrophe of the cattle-killing in 1855, and in the complete
destruction of their political viability. No serious attempt has yet
been made, one notices, to estimate the population losses of the Xhosa
as a result of European firepower and a rapidly shrinking land base.
Compare too the relative impact of Matiwane' s short stay in the
Caledon valley with the effects of the thirty year Boer offensive on
the southern Sotho. Or contrast the decade-long battle between the
Ndebele and Sotho north of the Vaal with the five hour Boer massacre
of the Ndebele in the Mosega basin on 12 January 1837. Consider the
relative impact of the Zulu on the Swazi and Mpondo with the smashing
of their armies by the Boer commandoes in 1838 and 1839. Mfecane
propaganda has long served to conceal this disproportion in the scale
of violence in nineteenth-century South Africa. The outer, overpopu-
lated horseshoe of the Africans and white control of the best lands of
the Orange Free State, Natal and the Transvaal resulted not from the
mfecane but as the purposeful consequence of a century of European
violence followed by the formalised land seizures of the twentieth
century.
Lastly: how valid is Omer-Cooper's transference of the Zulu 'revo-
lution' into the heart of his analysis of the mfecane? Omer-Cooper's
treatment of the Shaka era, qua analysis of the structure of the Zulu
kingdom, it must be said, is ordinary. None of the questions as to
how, why, when, or .indeed if the great changes in Nguni society took
place are resolved. This attempt to make the mfecane pivot around
Shaka poses certain problems. Some of Shakars innovations had been
implemented elsewhere and earlier. The ibutho for instance was
widespread among the northern Nguni before Shaka. In view of our
minimal knowledge of pre-1800 Nguni structures, it would at present be
hazardous to attempt to date the development of changes which had
penetrated the Ndwandwe and the Mthethwa almost certainly well by the
end of the eighteenth century. The changes may have been evolutionary
over a long period rather than revolutionary and sudden. The Ngwane
ancestors of the Swazi broke away from the Ndwandwe in the eighteenth
century; as did both Soshagane and Zwangendaba around 1818-22.
Mzilikazi's Ndebele were closely connected to the Ndwandwe.
Mzilikazi was an innovator parallel to Shaka. They were co-equal
state-builders springing from a common and earlier tradition. The
inference of this is to extend Omer-Cooper's mfecane north of the
Pongola and back to the eighteenth century. But why use the term, one
that is already loaded down with other dubious meanings, for
developments among the northern Nguni about which our knowledge is so
shadowy? Bryant did well without it. Bringing the internal develop-
ments in northern Nguni society into the mfecane thus raises the issue
of the definition of the mfecane as a datable era of history even more
urgently than Ellenberger's Caledon valley usage. If it is impossible
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to assign a beginning, it is almost as difficult to define an ending.
One cannot end the Zulu mfecane with the assassination of Shaka in
1828 since this leaves out the career of Dingane. We leave the
Caledon valley chronologies behind, and, by including Dingane's reign,
move into an era when the Zulu were vitally affected by the growing
pressures from the whites in the south. Once more it becomes
impossible to separate off African history. Omer-Cooper is drawn into
bringing the history of the Zulu kingdom right down to 1879 within the
mfecane's capacious embrace. But the survival of the Zulu kingdom
until then was much influenced by the takeover of the British in Natal
in the early 1840s and the British tolerance of its survival. It is
even more difficult to draw mfecane end dates for the Ndebele, the
Gaza and the Ngoni which do not tautologically merely indicate their
overthrow by colonial conquest.
This leaves us with the Nguni diaspora. Obviously the careers of
Mzilikazi, Sebetwane, Soshangane, Zwangendaba and the others have a
unity. Equally obviously the diaspora was linked to events in north-
ern Nguniland which gave birth to the Zulu kingdom of Shaka. Together
this constituted a major episode of south-central African history.
Yet the case of retaining the word mfecane to describe them is, in my
view, thin. The roots of the nguni revolution and of the migrations
go back to before the rise of Shaka. As an era, they only incidentally
overlap with the Caledon valley chronology of Ellenberger. And the
diaspora was not a purely African movement. The involvement of Mzili-
kazi with the Griquas and the Boers in the 1820s and 1830s, of the
Swazi with the Boers and the Portuguese, of the Gaza with the
Portuguese, and of the Ngoni with the Arabs and the Germans illustrate
this. By abandoning Ellenberger and Walker•s definitions of the
mfecane historians could, south of the Limpopo, the more easily ex-
amine the interaction of the Nguni raiders with the even more for-
midable invaders from the Cape. Africanists would be free to assess
the impact of the Nguni migrant kingdoms on local peoples, examine the
mechanisms of the Nguni state formations, even to draw links between
the great Nguni leaders of the past and the problems of the present,
without implying an acceptance of the more racist innuendoes of South
African mfecane ideology. Historians (if they can be found) could get
on with the job of describing the conflict of cultures in nineteenth-
century South Africa without being frightened off by the fiction that
the hammerlbow of a purely black mfecane created the foundations on
which the future South African state was built.
SOME CONCLUSIONS
From their innocent emergence on the eastern frontier in the 1820s,
the fetcani, later upgraded into the mfecane (or lifaqane), were
press-ganged into serving several not entirely altruistic historical
ends. At the turn of the twentieth century the lifaqane evolved as a
combined concept glorifying Moshoeshoe at the expense of Matiwane and
Sekonyela; and as a self-eulogy by the French missionaries. They
turned the 1820s into a hellish inferno the better to contrast the
(alleged) peace, security and progress brought by European civilisa-
tion. The use of violence in the imposition of the latter was
omitted. At about the same time, before and after the Union of South
Africa in 1920, other writers, notably Theal and Walker, gave the
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shape to a new variant, the mfecane, as a part legitimation of the
white conquest of and land seizures from blacks in the nineteenth
century. The 1913 Natives Land Act and the mfecane were close
companions, the latter describing as self-inflicted what the former
took by force. In the 1960s and 1970s the mfecane was updated.
Inside South Africa it was adapted to explain the origins, if not the
creation of the black homelands, at a time when South Africans badly
needed all the help they could get in justifying this process both to
an international audience, and to their own up and coming generations.
At the same time, bizarrely, historians mainly outside South Africa,
not having noticed the use to which the mfecane was being put south of
the Limpopo, hitched the mfecane to an alternative history that
stressed the glories of the African past and attempted to provide for
Africans self-respect and a defence against European suggestions that
the African past was sterile, static and barbaric. The racist
interpretation has been shielded from view by the Africanist one.
The result must surely bewilder any student who attempts to define
the mfecane with any concise coherence. The mfecane is today a thick-
et of theories past and present, the debris of the former coexisting
with the sophistications of the latter. The difficulties of getting
to the roots of this muddle have been compounded by the growing legit-
imation of the mfecane through constant repetition and most people's
assumption that this or that strand of the mfecane must have a basis
somewhere. Since everyone agrees about it it must be true. Even the
best writers have accepted, if not toasted it. The concept covers so
much ground that most students approaching the mfecane tend to see
only a part rather than the whole. It is either too \^\\&% » o r
amorphous, or uncontroversial to attract the PhD student. Espe-
cially on its home ground in South Africa, where the study of African
history is still regarded with suspicion, there are so few historians
with the necessary inclination or economic base to study nineteenth-
century African history. The few there are, take the mfecane for
granted and turn to more fashionable topics to make their careers.
The main interramifying flaws of the mfecane are these. As an era
of African history the mfecane does not work. In Ellenberger's Caledon
valley version the necessity to bring in the Griqua, driven on by the
whites to the south of them, shows that the troubles of the 1820s and
early 1830s sprang as much from the Cape as from the Nguni east. In
its Zulu-centred version the problems of cause, content and chronology
are as yet unresolved. The fusion of the Nguni 'revolution' with
Ellenberger's very local, Moshoeshoe-orientated preoccupations is not
so uncontroversial as is generally imagined a decade or so after
Omer-Cooper' s ellisions. It is also an error to attribute the
emergence of Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland to the mfecane.
The enclave states were created as a consequence of European
expansion. The associated claims that the mfecane depopulated the
Orange Free State, the Transvaal and Natal, and that the twentieth-
century homelands were fathered by the mfecane are politically
inspired lies. Recent white South African versions of the mfecane and
Africanist treatments display unbridgable incompatibilities of fact
and interpretation. The mfecane's very versatility makes it meaning-
less. Leaving aside the the post Omer-Cooper Africanist definitions,
the historiographical evolution of the mfecane was a selective
treatment of the evidence that in the main highlighted the impact of
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Africans on Africans which, it was repeatedly affirmed, was purely-
destructive, and virtually ignored the impact of Europeans on
Africans, which was idealised.
We need a careful study of the European mfecane. Black and white
history in southern Africa needs urgently to be reintegrated. The
alternative path glimpsed by the Kiewiet is still available. Though
it was partly buried under the mfecane avalanche of the 1960s it can
and should be reopened and further explored.
Some readers, conceivably, may accept some of the above, but argue
that the mfecane can be reformed by weeding out the tendentious parts
of the theory, leaving the inner idea purged and strong. But what is
to remain? One student will reform it this way; another will
sandpaper somewhere else. And inside South Africa, mfecane ideology
will assuredly continue to be disseminated, dirtying even the purest
of reformed mfecanes. The soloution is to leave the mfecane where it
evolved and belongs: as a plaything of South African historiographical
and political ideology, and to use other terms (Nguni diaspora, Zulu
'revolution', Griqua invasions, clash of cultures, white land
seizures) for past events which were caught up in the mfecane net.
The time has come for serious students of South African history to
drop the mfecane from their historical vocabulary.
SUMMARY
The mfecane (or lifaqane) is essentially a twentieth-century
concept that evolved nearly a century after the events wo which it
refers occurred. Its general acceptance is even more recent, dating
from the publication of Omer-Cooper1s Zulu Aftermath in 1966. An
analysis of the evolution of the mfecane in South African history -
from the fetcani intruders into the Kei region in the 1820s to its
adaption by historians, especially in school textbooks, in the 1970s
to account for and legitimate the South African 'Homelands' - shows it
to be a tendentious, flawed and contradictory concept, that was
developed for mainly propagandist reasons. Today it is used
contradictorily by Africanists to stress the creativity of the African
past, and by white historians in South Africa to highlight its
genocidal destuctiveness. There is neither agreement as to which era
nor to which geographical arena the mfecane refers. But perhaps the
most serious result of mfecane ideology is to downplay the impact of
white militarism on and land seizures from African societies in
nineteenth-century South Africa. Paradoxically, a concept which since
Omer-Cooper appears to bring the African past back into history ends
up by even more rigorously isolating it. It is suggested that the use
of the word mfecane (in contradistinction to an urgent need to
reassess the themes embraced by it) be dropped by all, save those who
wish to continue to argue that the unequal land distribution between
blacks and whites in today's South Africa originally derived from an
orgy of African self-destruction in the 1820s and 1830s which
depopulated the Orange Free State, the Transvaal and Natal just in
time for the white occupation.
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